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Abstract— The Thai Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) has been undergoing reform since the early 1990s. The first stage 
of reform resulted in the introduction of Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and Small Power Producers (SPPs) 
programs. This was followed by, in the mid-to-late 1990s, a proposal to introduce a market-oriented reform. This 
reform program envisaged the separation of generation from transmission and distribution functions; introduction of 
competition in generation; development of new market-oriented regulatory arrangements, and the privatization of the 
industry. This reform, argued its proponents, will improve the efficiency of the electricity industry; lower electricity 
tariffs; improve quality of service; draw private investment into power generation sector; reduce the government’s 
investment burden of financing expensive electricity infrastructure and hence enhance its capacity for investing in other 
priority programs such as health, education and other social activities. This paper examines the veracity of these 
arguments. This examination is assisted by a historical review of the evolution of the Thai Electricity Supply Industry 
(ESI). This review reveals that the above noted arguments are unsupportable on the basis of the technological, 
economic, environmental, social and political realities prevalent in Thailand. This paper further emphasizes the need to 
clearly identify the ‘real’ rationale for reform so that an appropriate reform pathway – consonant with socio-political 
contexts in Thailand – could be selected.
Keywords— Electricity Supply Industry, Historical Review, Reform, Thailand.
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the last fifteen years, the Thai Electricity Supply 
Industry has undergone reform in its structure, ownership 
and regulation. Prompted by concerns about poor 
industry performance, the Thai government initiated a 
process of reform of the electricity industry in the year 
1992. The first step in the process was the introduction of 
Independent Power Producer (IPP) and Small Power 
Producer (SPP) programs with the aim to meet the 
growing demand for electricity. This was followed by, in 
the mid-to-late 1990s, a proposal to introduce a market-
oriented reform. The main catalyst for this reform was 
the East Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. This reform, 
argued its proponents, will improve the efficiency of the 
electricity industry; lower electricity tariffs; improve the 
quality of service; draw private investment into power 
generation sector; and reduce the government’s 
investment burden of financing expensive electricity 
infrastructure and hence enhance its capacity for 
investing in other priority programs such as health, 
education and other social activities. This paper 
examines the veracity of these arguments. This 
examination is assisted by a historical review of the 
evolution of the Thai Electricity Supply Industry (ESI). It 
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starts with the beginning of electricity, through the 
industry establishment, to the foundation for 
privatization, the first step of electricity reform and 
finally a proposal for a market-oriented reform. This 
paper also emphasizes the need to clearly identify the 
‘real’ rationale for reform so that an appropriate reform 
pathway – consonant with socio-political contexts in 
Thailand – could be selected. 
2. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE THAI 
ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 
This section provides a detailed description of the 
historical evolution of the Thai electricity industry. This 
description is partitioned into five time periods, from the 
beginning of electrification in the year 1884, to the year 
2006. These time periods signify significant changes in 
the industry’s organizations and institutions. For each 
time period, analysis is carried out to delineate the 
influence of social, political and other factors on shaping 
the electricity industry’s organizations and institutions, 
and to explain the reasons behind electricity reforms in 
Thailand. 
2.1 Early Days (1884-1949)
Electricity was introduced in Thailand, in 1884, during 
the reign of King Chulalongkorn, by Filed Marshal Chao 
Phraya Surasakdi Montri, after his diplomatic mission to 
Europe. He first financed, with proceeds from the sale of 
his inherited land, for 14,400 baht, the purchase of two 
electric generators and accessories from Britain in order 
to electrify the army building. When news spread to 
King Rama V, the general was requested to light up the 
Royal Grand Palace in Bangkok. The Palace was 
electrified for the first time on His Majesty’s Birthday, 
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September 20, 1884. Subsequently, the homes of other 
Royal Family members were electrified [1]. In 1887, a 
Danish company gained a concession to run an electric 
trolley from Bang Kaw Laem to the Royal Palace. The 
company then expanded into generation of electricity for 
lighting and set up a permanent generation system using 
wood fuel [2]. In 1897, this company sold its concession 
to an American company – Bangkok Electricity Light 
Syndicate – with a contract that the company had to 
supply lighting system for all streets and government 
buildings. However, the firm operated at a loss and later 
transferred its concession to another Danish company – 
Siam Electricity Co., Ltd. The office of this company 
was located at Wat Lieb which later became the head 
office of the Metropolitan Electricity Authority (MEA). 
In 1912, the Electrical Division of the Public Works 
Department installed another power plant at Sam Sen 
with 25,500 KW capacity in order to supply power to 
facilitate the construction of a filtering plant for Sam Sen 
Water Works and also to distribute surplus power to the 
public in the northern suburbs of Bangkok. 
Subsequently, electricity supply in the metropolis was 
firmly established, with Wat Lieb power plant of Siam 
Electricity Co., Ltd supplying power for the southern 
areas of Bangkok and the state run Sam Sen power plant 
covering the northern areas of the metropolis. When the 
concession of the private company ended in 1950, the 
government took over the operation and changed the 
name to Bangkok Electric Works. In 1958, the 
government established the Metropolitan Electricity 
Authority (MEA) by merging Bangkok Electric Works 
and the Electrical Division of the Public Works 
Department. 
For provincial areas, the government first distributed 
power supply in Ratchaburi province in 1927 and in 
Chiang Mai province in 1931. In the early stages, private 
sector was allowed concessions in power production.
Rural electrification efforts began when government 
set up a rural electricity division in the Interior 
Department that built power generating system in the 
town centre of Nakhon Phanom on the Laos border [3]. 
The system began generating electricity in 1930. Most of 
the power plants in those days were small-sized diesel 
generators and operated only during the night time, thus 
providing uneven service. Therefore, in order to 
standardize the power industry in provincial areas, the 
government established, in 1954, the Provincial 
Electricity Organization, which, in 1960, became the 
Provincial Electricity Authority (PEA), to be in charge of 
power distribution in all parts of the country except in 
the metropolitan areas. 
During this period, there were no common standards 
for electricity systems – especially the extent to which 
electricity would be generated in large power plants or 
by small decentralized systems. The structure of the 
industry was fragmented. There was decentralized 
control of the regional/individual power plants. Further, 
the ownership of the industry was diverse; there were 
over 200 separate small cooperative, municipal or 
privately owned utilities [3]. 
2.2 Industry Establishment (1950-1979) 
In this period, international agencies and aid programs 
began to exert considerable influence on Thai economic 
policy and development programs. An event with 
unusual significance for Thai economic history was a 
World Bank advisory mission in 1957 [4]. The mission 
aimed to study the economic situation of the country and 
to provide recommendations for the establishment of 
national economic planning system. The World Bank 
argued that the Thai government agencies worked 
without a guiding vision and thus state initiatives were 
uncoordinated and ineffective [5]. The Bank, therefore, 
recommended the setting up of a central planning agency 
to make a continuing study of the nation’s economy, and 
to draw up plans for its development. On the advice of 
the World Bank, the National Economic Development 
Board (NEDB) – a key entity with implication for the 
economy and polity – was established in 1959. In 1972, 
its name was changed to the National Economic and 
Social Development Board (NESDB), in order to 
emphasize the importance of social development in the 
development process. NESDB was responsible for 
preparing five-year development plans for the country. 
These plans have guided the transformation of Thailand 
from an agricultural to an industrial economy. The 
underlying philosophy of economic planning in Thailand 
is commitment to market economy. 
The First Development Plan (1961-1965) was 
essentially a public expenditure program. The principal 
objective was to encourage economic growth in the 
private sector through the provision of basic 
infrastructure facilities in transport, communications, 
power, social and public services, and agriculture [4]. 
This first plan initiated the modern era of development. 
The government shifted its role from dominating the 
economy through public investment to becoming a 
facilitator of private companies by providing 
fundamental infrastructure. Due to limited domestic 
savings, foreign borrowings by both the public and the 
private sectors were brought in to fill the gap. Trade 
deficits and government budget deficits were common 
phenomena in Thailand during those years. On the 
advice of and concessionary financing from USAID and 
the World Bank, work began on a number of large 
generation projects [6]. Bhumibol was one of the first of 
numerous World Bank loans to EGAT for building large-
scale dams and power plants. Other dams that followed 
in the 1970s and 1980s had names little known outside 
Thailand: Sirindhorn, Sirikit, Sri Nakharin, and Kho 
Laem [7]. In order to receive concessionary financing 
from the World Bank, Thailand was encouraged to form 
state-owned electricity companies [6]. For example, 
EGAT is largely a World Bank creation; in fact, back in 
the late 1950s, the Bank insisted that the Thai 
government create an autonomous, independent power 
agency, which later became EGAT, as a condition for 
future power loans. The Bank was not only directly 
responsible for EGAT’s formation, it was EGAT’s main 
source of external financing, and thus exercised an 
important influence in its attention. 
In 1968, the Office of Prime Minister issued the 
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Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand Act, which 
established the EGAT by merging several regional state-
owned generating authorities. By then, the Thai Minister 
of Interior enacted the Metropolitan Electricity Authority 
Act and the Provincial Electricity Authority Act, which 
in effect established the MEA in 1958 and PEA in 1960. 
A typical structure of the Thai electricity industry was 
vertically integrated; for example, EGAT was the sole 
agency responsible for generation and transmission of 
electricity to the entire nation. The distribution and retail 
service functions were the responsibility of MEA (in 
Bangkok, Nonthaburi and Samutprakarn) and PEA (in 
the provincial cities and the countryside). By 1981, over 
50 % of Thai population had access to electricity [3]. In 
Thailand, electricity was a practical necessity of 
industrialization as well as played an important role in 
national ideology, symbolizing a new type of social 
compact between the state and citizen. In propaganda 
and popular consciousness alike, images of a society 
with universal and affordable electricity became 
important tropes of state-led development; the conjoining 
of the electrification enterprise to the majesty of the state 
can be seen in the expression of Thai peasants – fay 
laung, “the King electricity” [8]. The role of electricity in 
powering Thailand’s industrialization and the rapid 
expansion of the organizations involved made the three 
power utilities very strong politically. By the 1970s, 
these three power utilities were effectively self-
regulating with the exception of basic financial 
requirements set by the Ministry of Finance [9]. 
As noted above, the three power utilities were strong 
politically. It is, however, interesting to note that the 
most powerful player in the electricity industry is EGAT. 
This is partly because of its location in the government 
structure (also see Smith, 2003 cited in [10]). Further, 
EGAT has not only played a major role in central 
planning for electricity development but EGAT’s 
political power has enabled it to influence the 
privatization policy. For instance, EGAT employees 
have been rather vocal in their opposition to the 
privatization of state electric utilities. The recent 
cancellation of the electricity privatization program was 
attributed by many to the opposition by EGAT union.  
The multiplicity of the institutional regime for electricity 
as noted above posed some co-ordination problems. For 
instance, the responsibility for tariffs, capital project 
proposals, budgets for submissions to the council of 
Ministers, annual financial performance, and requests for 
government equity and loans is shared by several 
agencies including the Committee for Power Policy and 
Development, the Budget Bureau, the Tariff Rate 
Committee, NEADB, Ministry of Finance [11]. Often, 
these are conflicts and none of the agencies has the 
overall policy responsibility. Decisions are typically 
made by a consensus of all the agencies, including the 
three state electric utilities. 
2.3 The foundation for privatization (1980-1989) 
During this period, several internal and external factors 
influenced the further development of the industry and 
laid the foundations for its privatization. Those factors 
include high public sector debt in the electricity industry 
due to the oil price shocks of the 1970s; decreasing 
public and international donor funds for electricity as 
country planners adopted neo-liberal policies that 
emphasized reduced public sector; rapid economic 
expansion which subsequently resulted in rapid 
electricity system expansion; and institutional revolution. 
The Oil Price Shocks of the 1970s 
During the period for the Second Plan (1967-1971), there 
had been a rapid expansion of the electricity system. 
Much of this expansion was financed by borrowings. 
Consequently, Thai utilities built up high debt with the 
energy sector accounting for over 46 % of all foreign 
loans between 1967 and 1971 [6]. In fact, borrowing had 
been a key factor in the sector’s strategy to meet the 
growing energy demands of the Thai economy [11]. But 
the charged tariff was generally lower than the cost of 
electricity generation. Furthermore, because of heavy 
reliance on imported oil, the Thai economy suffered 
severely from the two oil price shocks of the 1970s. 
Inevitably, Thai utilities were faced with a substantial 
debt as a consequence of these two oil shocks. Especially 
between 1978 and 1981, Thailand’s oil import bill 
tripled, sparking a debt crisis in which government debt 
peaked at 39 per cent of GDP [12]. This crisis forced 
Thailand to undertake a comprehensive economic 
adjustment program. Thailand took recourse to the IMF 
and the World Bank to agree on a structural adjustment 
program and obtain a Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL). 
Thailand received support from the IMF in the form of 
Stand-by Agreement in 1981, 1982 and 1985, and from 
the World Bank through SALs in 1982-83 [13]. The 
1981 Stand-by Agreement with the IMF aimed at 
reducing the public sector deficit and to restore 
international competitiveness [13]. In 1982-3, Thailand 
took out structural adjustment loans (SALs) from the 
World Bank with the conditionality that included 
increasing energy prices and implementing measures to 
privatize state-owned enterprises to reduce their colossal 
debt. However, this first effort to privatize utilities was 
met with fierce opposition from labour unions of the 
state electric utilities and independent academics, and 
finally defeated [6]. 
Emergence of neo-liberal policies 
In the 1980s, there was a world-wide re-emergence of 
the neo-liberal ideology. Deregulation, privatization and 
free trade moved into the mainstream of political 
thought. Criticism of the Keynesian policies and 
championing of free markets moved rapidly from a few 
academic citadels and conservative think tank into 
concrete policy under the Regan and Thatcher 
administration [8]. The ideology of reducing the role and 
intervention of government and relying on the market 
mechanism has subsequently been widely adopted. The 
economic policies influenced by neo-liberalism were 
also adopted by the major international organizations 
such as the World Bank and the IMF [14]. The role of 
public international financial institutions was 
transformed as a result of these policies. Traditionally, 
they had supported the expansion of generation capacity 
through large-scale projects as discussed earlier. Under 
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the new policies, they shifted their traditional emphasis 
on economic and social goals from assisting country in 
its infrastructure development to an emphasis on 
increasing efficiency, expanding the role of private 
investment and changing the way government managed 
electricity industry. As a consequence of this, there was a 
decrease in support funds – previously provided with low 
interest rates and long repayment periods – from these 
financial institutions. These external donors began to 
make their lending conditional to the government 
opening up its electricity market to private ownership 
and competition. As noted above, structural adjustment 
loans (SALs) was one example of the conditional loans 
from the external donors. Economy-wide liberalization 
was coordinated through the vehicle of structural 
adjustment loans (SALs) [8]. 
Rapid Economic Expansion 
In contrast to the first half of the 1980s, there was a rapid 
and unexpected economic growth during the period 
1987-92. Between 1985 and 1994, Thailand has been one 
of the fastest growing economies in South-East Asia; its 
GDP grew at an annual rate of 9.5 percent [15]. This 
growth primarily resulted from a boom of manufactured 
exports and the massive inflow of private investment 
[16]. During the boom period, the annual electricity 
demand in Thailand increased at the rate of over 10 
percent. This rapid growth was brought about by a high 
rate of urbanization, an aggressive electrification 
program, a swift expansion in the service and 
manufacturing industries and a favourable pricing policy 
which made electricity use more economic than other 
fuels. This substantially increased demand and caused 
power shortages. Consequently, the Energy Planning and 
Policy Office (EPPO) (formerly the National Energy 
Policy Office of Thailand (NEPO), allowed EGAT to 
sign several Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) with 
independent power producers (IPPs) with contract terms 
ranging from 1 to 25 years [17].  In order to attract 
private investment with ensuring healthy profits and low 
risk to investors, the government provided generous 
terms for the PPAs. The PPAs were typically structured 
as ‘take-or-pay’ contracts which guaranteed IPPs a 
minimum purchase, whether the electricity was needed 
or not. 
Institutional Revolution 
In this period, the government was in transition from 
military dictatorships towards democracy. Before 1973, 
the central bureaucracy worked under the control of 
military rule. A catalytic pro-democracy student uprising 
in 1973 led to the emergence of a new breed of Thai 
political figures. Thai politics entered to a new phase. 
Especially during the Tinsulanonda government (1980-
1988), the democratization process in Thailand was 
gradually enhanced by restoring democratic institutions 
and maintaining a balance between the political 
differences of the military, the bureaucrats, and the 
politicians [18]. Economic interests, and the political 
parties associated with them, became more powerful as 
the economy developed. Business interests played an 
increasingly important role in the House of 
Representatives. This came in line with the emergence of 
neo-liberal policies and established the foundations for 
privatization. 
2.4 First step of electricity reform (1990-1997) 
Even though the first attempt to privatize the Thai 
electricity industry was not successful, domestic and 
international forces remained strong under the 
government in the 1990s. These led to the formation of 
the National Energy Policy Office (NEPO) and the rise 
of IPP program. The creation of NEPO was viewed as 
the first effort, after the establishment of EGAT, MEA 
and PEA, to reorganize the institutions involved in the 
electricity sector. As noted in section 2.2, several 
government agencies were involved in the electricity 
policy settings. The rise of NEPO was intended to 
transfer all the policy responsibility to one entity (i.e. 
NEPO). NEPO was formed as secretariat to the newly 
formed National Energy Policy Council (NEPC), which 
serves as a direct line to the Prime Minister’s Office on 
energy issues. Starting in the early 1990s, NEPO 
embarked on an ambitious electricity restructuring effort, 
the first stage of which was the introduction of 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs), to be followed by 
full competition in generation, and eventually retail 
competition [6].
There were also pressures from the external donors. 
By the early 1990s, international financial institutions 
sent strong signals that they would no longer be able to 
provide the financing to expand electricity capacity in 
developing countries at projected rates [8]. In order to 
meet electricity demand, developing countries would 
have to turn to private sector. During this period, these 
external donor agencies increased pressure to privatize, 
for instance, by creating barriers to accessing loans for 
the electricity sector. For example, in 1993, the World 
Bank put in place a new electricity lending policy. This 
policy enunciated new conditions for obtaining loans 
from the World Bank. These conditions included: the 
establishment of market-based regulatory regimes, 
commercialization and corporatization of the electricity 
sector, foreign ownership, and encouragement for private 
investment [19].   
The continuing pressures from the international 
financial agencies coming in parallel with the rapid rise 
of electricity demand created a situation which saw 
private investment as the best alternative. This coincided 
with the entry of a surplus of private capital searching for 
investments with high rate of returns and led the 
initiation of IPP program. The Small Power Producer 
(SPP) and Independent Power Producer (IPP) programs 
appeared to be the first steps of electricity reform in 
Thailand. A brief chronology of ESI reform in Thailand 
is presented in Table 1. Much of the focus of this reform 
was to facilitate private participation in electricity 
generation in order to mitigate immediate electricity 
shortages. Since 1992, the government has promoted 
greater role of the private sector in the power generation 
business, in the form of both SPP and IPP [17]. The 
purported aim of this initiative was to help reduce 
EGAT’s investment burden and bring down the overall 
power generation cost to levels that are lower than the 
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generation cost in the public sector. 
As a result of IPP and SPP programs, the role of the 
private sector has been increasing. Figure 1 reveals that 
the proportion of electricity generated by EGAT 
decreased from 89 per cent of the gross energy generated 
in Thailand in 1995, to 49 per cent in 2006. During the 
same period, the proportion of electricity generated by 
the private sector increased from 11 per cent in 1996 to 
51 per cent in 2006. 
The reduction in power generation costs, however, 
could not be achieved as shown in Figure 2. (Note: These 
calculations are based on the inclusion of capital 
expenditure, administrative expense, electricity purchase, 
fuel expenditure and other energy generation expense). 
The reasons for this unsuccessful outcome are the 
following: 
• Although the selection process of IPPs was 
competitive, the benefits of this, however, did not 
directly pass to the consumers. IPPs competed only 
to acquire a license to generate electricity and 
supply it to EGAT with fixed and long-term PPA. 
• Consequently, there was no competition to supply 
electricity at the cheapest possible price to the final 
consumers. Usually, the PPAs were signed before 
the projects start and the projected costs of the IPP 
projects were overestimated to cover risk. This is a 
common practice among the IPPs, which 
informally form a cartel to push up the contract 
price between themselves and EGAT, finally 
passing down to the consumers.  
• Even if the selected IPPs achieved greater 
technical efficiencies, the benefits of reduced costs 
were not passed on to the consumers because of 
the nature of long term contracts. 
The IPP and SPP programs were viewed by many as 
indicators of success of electricity reform program 
because these two programs and partial privatization of 
EGAT’s subsidiary received strong interest from both 
domestic and foreign investors. This encouraged the 
government to accelerate the market reform program. In 
1996, the government passed a resolution that would 
allow the separation of generation, transmission, 
distribution business. However, there was strong 
opposition from the electric utilities to these mores. 
2.5 Proposal for market-oriented reform (1998-2006) 
Despite this opposition, the pressures to further reform 
the electricity industry continued. The Asian financial 
crisis in 1997/1998 was the main catalyst for accelerating 
the reform process. This crisis made deep impacts on the 
whole economy of Thailand including the electricity 
sector. It resulted in the economic slow down and caused 
significant decline in electricity demand. This created a 
condition of excess capacity. The drop in electricity 
demand combining with the extreme depreciation of its 
currency made the financial condition of the electric 
utilities rather precarious. On 14 August 1997, the 
Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Bank of 
Thailand co-signed the first Letter of Intent (LOI) 
committing Thailand to the economic adjustment 
package outlined by the IMF [14]. According to the first 
LOI, the government agreed to accelerate privatization in 
key commercial and infrastructure sectors. The financial 
woes of the state utilities, coming in parallel with the 
new IMF loan conditions that emphasized privatization 
of the utilities, gave a new impetus for accelerating the 
reform process. As a result of this, the government 
committed to new structural reforms including 
privatization of state-owned enterprises in conformance 
with the agreement for international financial loan and to 
improve liquidity in the electricity sector. 
As previously mentioned in section 2.3, a significant 
program of private sector participation had already been 
undertaken in the electricity industry, primarily based on 
extensive use of the IPPs and facilitation of privately 
owned distributed generation facilities under the SPP 
program. The next stage of the industry transformation 
intended to build on the existing model by creating 
competitive markets across all elements of the industry. 
The main emphasis of the second step of electricity 
reform was to provide a market orientation to the 
electricity industry by introducing competition in 
electricity supply and providing choice to customers to 











































































































Fig. 2 Electricity Cost of Production (at 2002 constant 
prices)
 S. Wattana, D. Sharma and R. Vaiyavuth / GMSARN International Journal 2 (2008) 41 - 52  
46
Table 1.  A brief chronology of ESI reform events in Thailand
Reform Events Year 
Electricity law amendment 
Establishment of Electricity Generating Public Co Ltd. (EGCO)   
1992 
Privatized EGCO – subsidiary company of EGAT 1994 
IPP law 1996 
EGAT privatization plan (Master Plan) 1998 
Approval of the principle of establishment of an independent regulator 1999 
Establishment of Ratchaburi Electricity Generating Co Ltd. ( RATCH) 
Approval of Price-based power pool model 
Approval of the draft Energy Industry Act 
2000 
Proposal for New Electricity Supply Arrangement (NESA) model by EPPO 
Proposal for Partial liberalization, Cost-based power pool, Transitional model to net pool and 
Electricity Relation Committee’s (ERC) model by EGAT      
2002 
Abandonment of Price-based power pool  
Approval of Enhanced single buyer (ESB) model 
2003 
Postponement of privatization 2004 
Establishment of Electricity Regulatory Board  2005 
Resignation of regulatory committees in Electricity Regulatory Board 2006 
Enactment of the Energy Industry Act B.E. 2550  2007 
Establishment of Energy Regulatory Board  2008 
Sources: Compiled by this paper from various references 
In view of the new institutional arrangements, 
following the creation of NEPO, the establishment of 
Ministry of Energy (MOE) in 2002 marked a significant 
institutional change in the electricity industry. As a 
consequence of this, NEPO was renamed as the Energy 
Policy and Planning Office (EPPO) and its policy-
influencing role was reduced considerably. Previously, 
EPPO directly reported to the Minister. Under new 
arrangements, it reports to the Energy Permanent 
Secretary [6]. In addition, the state electric utilities: 
EGAT (formerly under the Office of the Prime Minister), 
and MEA and PEA (formerly under the Minister of 
Interior), were transferred to the MOE.  
The market-oriented reform prompted the undertaking 
of several studies about the pros and cons of the reform 
program. Foreign consultants and local institutions were 
assigned to undertake studies on the ESI restructuring 
model and privatization of the state electric utilities. 
These institutions proposed several reform models which 
could be summarize as follows. 
Price-based power pool
In 2000, the Chuan government approved the 
introduction of a price-based power pool model. The 
model was based on the recommendation of a study 
commissioned by NEPO. According to this study, 
generation companies would offer competitive bids into a 
wholesale power pool, while the newly established 
Independent System Operator (ISO) would be responsible 
for merit order dispatch, regulated distribution companies 
would be responsible for power distribution within their 
areas, and retailing companies would compete in the 
retailing market. The independent regulator would 
regulate the natural monopoly (transmission and 
distribution sections) and also promote real competition 
in generation and retailing sections. EGAT, MEA and 
PEA were recommended to split into separate companies 
and sell their assets to private sectors.  
The change of government, from the Chuan to Thaksin 
government in 2001, however, delayed the 
implementation of this proposal [14]. This, argue some, 
was due to the following reasons. 
• Concerns from EGAT officials and independent 
academics were expressed on price volatility, 
system reliability and adequacy of supply, abuse of 
market power, environment and impact on 
unprofitable customers in rural areas. 
• The California power crisis and the 
implementation of the New Electricity Trading 
Arrangement to replace the power pool in the UK 
in 2001 stimulated uncertainty about the merits of 
introducing a power pool in Thailand. 
• EGAT employees were strongly opposed to the 
plan as they argued that the power pool is a risky 
and expensive electricity trading system. 
Moreover, they were concerned about loss of job 
security and benefits, and loss of employment 
without adequate unemployment benefits. 
Another aspect worth mentioning is that the ideology 
emphasized market forces were reversed during the 
tenure of Thaksin government. This also played a role in 
the downfall of the power pool model. With the 
aspiration of becoming a regional leader and the hub of 
ASEAN, Thaksin focused on building a strong domestic 
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economy by using partial privatization as tools to 
achieve national aims, for example, expanding 
Thailand’s economic influence in other countries and 
boosting the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). As a 
result, the government finally dropped this model and 
turned to emphasize on partial privatization of SOEs. 
The Plans for preparing EGAT, MEA, and PEA to be 
corporatized and listed in the Stock Exchange were 
approved by the State Enterprise Policy Commission 
(SEPC) on 20 August 2002 [14].   
EGAT VS EPPO 
After the power pool model was dropped, the new 
Thaksin government called for further study on the most 
appropriate ESI model for Thailand. Several ESI models 
were proposed by both EPPO and EGAT. In 2002, EPPO 
proposed New Electricity Supply Arrangement (NESA) 
which is based on the New Electricity Trading 
Arrangement (NETA) of the UK. Under the NESA 
model, the electricity market is fully liberalized in both 
generating and retailing segments. Bilateral contracts are 
employed for electricity trading in the liberalized market. 
During the same time, EGAT proposed the Multiple 
buyers/Multiple sellers-Partial liberalization (PL) model. 
In the proposed PL model, the electricity market is 
partially opened up to allow the large industrial users to 
purchase power directly from the generators. The 
proportion of the liberalized market does not exceed 30 
per cent of the total electricity demand.  
In addition, EGAT appointed two consultant teams to 
study and recommend a suitable reform structure. A 
Cost-based power pool was proposed by Kema 
Consultants and Siam Commercial Bank. Under the cost-
based power pool model, all restructuring process is 
similar to the recommendation of the price-based power 
pool. The difference is that generators bid at their 
marginal costs or actual or estimated variable production 
cost of supply instead of bidding at their willingness to 
supply. The other model, Transitional model to New 
Pool, was recommended by the Asian Institution 
Technology (AIT). In the Transitional model to New 
Pool model, there are two models recommended for the 
intermediate and long terms. Under the model for the 
intermediate term, competition is introduced in 
generation and separation of generation and transmission 
is recommended. A System Agent (SAGE) is formed 
from the remaining units of EGAT after all generating 
facilities have been separated. SAGE will separate into 
two bodies, one to operate the power balancing market 
only and one to operate as a regulated retailer to fulfill 
the remaining obligation of PPAs. A modified form of 
IPP arrangement with special PPA is created. In the 
model for the long term, the proportion of electricity 
trading through bilateral contracts outside SAGE is 
expected to grow. SAGE is finally expected to perform a 
more system balancing role and less electricity trading 
role under PPA. In the midst of the study period, 
Electricity Relation Committee (ERC) – a joint 
management-labour union of EGAT, also proposed the 
model that claimed to be similar to the model destined to 
be use in Taiwan. Under the ERC’s model, customers are 
divided into two groups, those in captive market and 
those in free market. Transmission access is opened to 
large industry customers. Negotiation would be used to 
terminate PPAs of IPPs and SPPs. All new private 
generations compete to sell in the competitive market. In 
a free market, there is no pool and no buying or selling 
mechanism created for the free market. 
On 23 December 2002, the MOE, through EPPO, 
organized a seminar on ESI reform to brainstorm and 
discuss about the optimal ESI model by comparing the 
current structure with the models discussed above, 
particularly in relation to electricity system security, 
competition, tariff, regulation, quality of service and 
public share offering. The deliberations at the seminar 
were, however, unable to develop a consensus on a 
specific model. Finally, the models proposed by both 
EPPO and EGAT were dropped by the Thaksin 
administration because there was no consensus about the 
ESI model and privatization among EPPO, EGAT, 
MEA, PEA, the private sectors and academics, resulting 
mainly from the different incentives of each agent. For 
example, EGAT, MEA and PEA prefer to stay in a 
monopolistic manner and support the ESI models that do 
not allow them to separate. The government would like 
to unbundled the industry and then privatize the SOEs as 
fast as possible to promote capital market development 
without serious consideration on the ESI model. 
Enhanced Single Buyer (ESB) 
On 9 September 2003, the Cabinet approved the 
cancellation of the Cabinet resolution of 25 July 2000 on 
the ESI reform and the establishment of power pool and 
assigned the MOE to conduct further study on the ESI 
model. At this time, it seemed that the future direction 
for the ESI restructuring model was unclear, however, 
the Cabinet approved to corporatize the whole EGAT as 
a public company under Corporatization Law. 
After being tasked by the Cabinet on 9 September 
2003, MOE hired Boston Consulting Group (BSG) to 
conduct a study on strategies for the development of 
Thailand’s energy sector and the power sector efficiency 
improvement program. This study includes studies on 
ESI model, the regulatory framework and the tariff 
mechanism for Thailand. The BSG proposed five 
alternative ESI structures: Full Competition (FC) model, 
Competitive Bilateral Contract (CBC) model, Partial 
Competition (PC) model, Enhanced Single Buyer (ESB) 
model and Super National Champion (SNC) model. In 
September 2003, a steering committee was formed to 
advance strategies for the development of Thailand’s 
energy sector and power sector efficiency improvement 
program. The committee discussed the reform model 
proposed by the Boston Consulting Group and agreed 
that the ESB model was the best alternative that should 
be adopted not only for ESI restructuring in the 
foreseeable future, but also to facilitate the process of 
corporatization and privatization. The ESB model is 
quite similar to the current ESI model (single buyer 
model). The ESB model is different from the current 
model in that there will be an account unbundling of 
EGAT’s generation and transmission businesses, and any 
new IPPs will have to compete directly against EGAT’s 
generation. Further, thirty per cent of EGAT would be 
 S. Wattana, D. Sharma and R. Vaiyavuth / GMSARN International Journal 2 (2008) 41 - 52  
48
sold on the stock exchange to raise capital so that the 
monopoly could stand a better chance against the 
international competitors at the regional level.  
The success, as claimed by the government, of the 
Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) privatization, in 
2001, gave the impetus for accelerating the privatization 
of state electric utilities without restructuring. Due to the 
reversal of the economic policy by the Thaksin 
government, the idea of creating competitive market for 
electricity was replaced by building EGAT as a National 
Champion by adopting the ESB model. This made the 
disappearance of choice and competition but instead 
continued to focus only on privatization of the industry. 
The initial public offering (IPO) of EGAT, MEA and 
PEA were scheduled in the first, third, and fourth 
quarters of 2004, respectively. However, following 
renewed protests from EGAT and other labour unions, 
the Thaksin government decided, on 23 February 2004, 
to put the privatization of EGAT on hold indefinitely. 
In early 2005, the Thaksin government was re-elected 
and the privatization program of state enterprises was 
revived. EGAT was the first public enterprise to be 
corporatized in April 2005, and it was scheduled to be 
listed on the Stock Exchange in October 2005.  A group 
of NGOs and labour unions filed a petition with the 
Supreme Court a few days before the scheduled listing. 
On 23 March 2006, the Supreme Court ended the 
privatization of EGAT by revoking two Royal Decrees 
that led to its corporatization in 2005. As a consequence 
of this verdict, EGAT will remain a state enterprise and 
the plans for its stock market listing were cancelled [24]. 
With the view to provide effective regulation, the 
Thaksin government established the interim regulator, 
namely the Electricity Regulatory Board, on December 
1, 2005 [25]. This regulatory board was temporarily 
established because it was expected that the permanent 
regulatory authority would be established by the Energy 
Industry Act.  
Note: 1 The Energy Regulatory Board was established in February, 2008   
Fig. 3  Current structure of the Thai electricity industry 
The September 2006 military coup put on hold further 
changes to the structure of the electricity industry. It also 
resulted in the resignation of the interim regulators. In 
December 2007, the government enacted the Energy 
Industry Act B.E. 2550 which emphasized the 
establishment of the Energy Regulatory Board and the 
Energy Regulatory Office. The Energy Regulatory Board 
was established on 1 February 2008. This regulatory 
board is responsible for regulation of the energy sector 
including electricity and gas. This independent 
regulatory body is expected to help increase 
transparency, creditability and public participation in the 
energy sector decision-making. Figure 3 illustrates the 
current structure of the Thai electricity industry.
3. RATIONALE FOR ELECTRICITY REFORM 
IN THAILAND  
3.1 Purported rationale for a market-oriented reform 
As mentioned earlier, a market-oriented reform was 
proposed for the Thai ESI in 1998 in the form of the 
Master Plan. The Master Plan provided guidelines, 
principles, and practices for increasing effective private 
sector participation in the economy and served as the 
basic blueprint for this reform. The main underlying 
principle of this plan was to deregulate the industry 
wherever possible to increase competition. This reform 
(emphasis only on privatization plan), argued its 
proponents, will [26], [27] 
− reduce the investment burden of he government as 
well as the public sector debt;
− improve the economic efficiency of the industry, 
as measured by decreased costs of production 
and/or price of service;
− improve quality of service, including enhancing 
consumer choice;
− complete needed infrastructure investment 
projects;
− reduce subsidies and loan guarantees to state 
electric utilities;
− utilize the proceeds from the sale of  state electric 
utilities for reinvestment in the economy and 
social sector;
− improve and/or expand services;
− create new employment opportunities; and
− enhance government ability to invest in social and 
public services.
A deeper review, however, reveals that the above 
noted arguments are unsupportable on the basis of the 
technological, economic, environmental, social and 
political realities prevalent in Thailand. The following 
discussion provides support to this claim. 
Attract private investment
Attracting private investment is one of the major 
arguments for reform. Such investment clearly depends 
on investor confidence in the country’s economy which 
is typically shaped by the political and institutional 
climate for economic policy, legal system and control of 
corruption. In Thailand, the constitutions and governance 
philosophies are combination of the traditional and 
modern western style [28]. Thai politics have 
traditionally involved a delicate balancing act between 
the crown, the army, the bureaucracy and powerful 
economic interests [29]. Political and legal frameworks 
are weak. Corruption is widely perceived to be a serious 
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governance problem. Transparency International’s 2007 
survey listed Thailand as 84th out of the 179 countries 
surveyed with Corruption Perception Index (CPI) equal 
to 3.3 (on a zero to 10 scales, with 10 being least corrupt) 
[30]. The Opacity Factor for Thailand for 2004 was 35 (0 
indicates best and 100 indicates worst) [31]. This factor 
represents the five key dimensions that affect capital 
market, namely corruption, legal system, economic 
policies, accounting standards and practices (including 
corporate governance and information release), 
regulatory regime [31]. Such climate, therefore, would 
not inspire much investor confidence. Moreover, the 
political and policy uncertainties associated with the 
military coup also have contributed to lowering investor 
confidence.  
Reduction in electricity prices 
The argument that electricity reform would lead to a 
reduction in electricity prices does not appear to be 
supportable on the basis of available evidence. 
According to Sharma [32], ‘Electricity generation 
accounts for nearly two-thirds of the total cost of 
electricity supply... In a situation of excess capacity, 
competition in generation has a potential to exert 
downward pressure on the cost of electricity production’. 
But electricity system in Thailand still confront with a 
condition of capacity constrained system. Therefore, it is 
unclear how the competitive pool would lead to a 
reduction in electricity prices. In contrast, it seems that 
the cost of electricity production is likely to be higher as 
a consequence of environmental concern. In recognition 
of global warming, there is now pressure for generating 
electricity from environmentally benign fuels. 
Besides, Fathollazadah and Sharma [31] stated that ‘it 
is widely known that electricity in the ASEAN region is 
sold at subsidized rates and it is also common knowledge 
that electricity is priced below it marginal cost in most 
countries in the region’. In fact, the proponents of reform 
argued that subsidies should be removed in order to 
reflect marginal cost of production. Consequently, 
removal of subsidies clearly could not lower electricity 
price.
On the question of removal of subsidies, it needs to be 
viewed in a larger socio-political context. Subsidies 
provide considerable benefits to consumers who have 
generally low levels of income and electricity 
requirements. As a consequence, removal subsidized 
electricity to this group of consumers may not only 
socially undesirable but politically unfeasible as well 
[31].
Enhancing consumer choice 
Providing choices to consumer to select their service 
providers seems to be meaningless when viewed in the 
context of Thailand where: 10 % of the population 
remain under the national poverty line of 1386 Baht per 
person per month, only 1 % in urban but 13 % in rural 
areas; 84 % of the population live in rural areas and 
generate income from agriculture-related activities; the 
distribution of income in the country is highly skewed, 
with the top 20 percent earning nearly 12 times more 
income than the bottom 20 percent in the year 2007; the 
GINI coefficient (commonly used indicator of economic 
inequality) for Thailand for 2004 was 0.49 (0 indicates 
perfect equality and 1 indicates perfect inequality) [33].
It is evident from the above discussion that a majority of 
the poor live in rural areas where it is uneconomic to 
extend electricity supply. These people do not have the 
capacity to exercise choices or even to pay their 
electricity. Consumer choices, therefore, appear to be 
insignificant for them.
New employment opportunities 
The electricity market reform, argued its proponents, 
would lead to create new employment opportunities. 
This argument appears to be unjustified. It was, in fact, 
argued by multilateral agencies, international banks and 
financial institutions that the Thai electricity industry 
was inefficient. Such inefficiency, it was further argued, 
resulted from overstaffing, poor management, inefficient 
operation and uneconomic pricing practices. The 
expectation that electricity reform would lead to create 
new employment, therefore, contradicts itself with the 
causes of electricity reform 
In fact, even in developed countries, for example 
Australia, which implemented electricity market reform 
since 1991, a number of people employed in its 
electricity industry have continued to decline since the 
onset of reform [34]. 
Other benefits of electricity reform 
Benefits of reform in terms of improved service, 
enhancing government capacity for investing in other 
social and public services do not appear to have any 
reference point for convincing the possibility of the 
argument. A belief in the success of electricity reform in 
other countries (mainly developed countries) and in 
replicability of such success for Thailand appears to be 
baseless. The economic, political, social and cultural 
backgrounds of those countries are significantly different 
from Thailand. These backgrounds are important for 
designing reform program because they reflect several 
dimensions of reform and critically influence the 
feasibility of reform program and hence the outcomes 
that could be achieved from them. 
The earlier discussion suggests that much of the 
underlying arguments for reform are untenable. There 
are inconsistencies between the purported rationale and 
realities prevalent in Thailand. The discussion further 
reveals that the planners aim to achieve a rather diverse 
and wide range of objectives from reform, for example, 
attracting private investment, improving quality of 
service, developing capital markets, and ensuring 
economic prosperity. There does not appear to be any 
compelling logic behind these objectives. For instance, 
how the electricity price (currently below marginal cost) 
could be decreased. The outcomes of this reform, 
therefore, are unlikely to be desirable. 
3.2 ‘Real’ rationale for electricity reform 
A historical review of the Thai electricity industry 
(Section 2) has revealed that the ‘real’ rational for 
electricity reform was different from what are argued by 
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the proponents of electricity reform (As presented in 
Section 3.1). The ‘real’ rationale, it is argued, has its 
roots in several internal and external developments and 
influences. For example: 
• One major influence behind electricity reform was 
pressures from the international financial 
institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and 
Asian Development Bank. These institutions, 
especially the World Bank, played a significant 
role in promoting, strategizing and even 
compelling electricity reform in Thailand. For 
example, the structural adjustment loans (SALs) 
which Thailand took from the World Bank, in 
1982-3, came with conditionality that included 
implementing measures to privatized state-owned 
enterprises. In fact, it should be evident from the 
earlier discussion that the World Bank and other 
international agencies have continuously played an 
important role in shaping the Thai electricity 
industry since 1960s.
• Another significant influence for electricity reform 
arose in the context of major economic crisis, for 
example, the oil price increases of the 1970s and 
the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997/8. As discussed 
above, these crises created opportunities for the 
international donor agencies to impose new 
funding conditions on developing countries; 
resulted in economic-wide reforms – conditions 
outlined by the donor agencies. For example, 
market reforms under the Structural Adjustment 
Loans (SALs) and the Letter of Intent (LOI) by the 
World Bank and IMF respectively. More 
interestingly, the undertaking of electricity reform 
was included in both of these two programs. 
• Domestic forces were also important. The process 
of democratization led to the emergence of new 
liberal business leaders. Therefore, the political 
ideology changed in favour of the market. 
Previously, the government considered electricity 
as a vital ingredient for social and economic 
development of the citizens. Accordingly, the 
government took all responsibility for electricity 
provision. It resulted in the establishment of 
vertically-integrated public monopoly structures. 
Under the market-oriented political leadership, the 
government created space for the private sector in 
electricity development. The economic crisis also 
created a political opportunity for the market-
oriented government to implement privatization 
policy. Privatization appeared to the government 
as a vehicle of attracting private capital flows to 
address fiscal crises.
• Allegation by some that self-interest by the ruling 
elites was also a significant factor behind 
electricity privatization. Some of the business-
oriented politicians with dual roles – as citizens’ 
representatives and as executive directors of 
companies – played a part in promoting the 
privatization of the industry. They stood to gain 
personally from the transfer of public resources to 
the private sector. The example of this was given 
by Palettu [35] in the case of PTT experience.  
This review also suggests that the sequence of steps 
undertaken to reform the electricity industry in Thailand 
was somewhat out of synchronism. For example, the 
establishment of the strong, credible, and independent 
regulatory body should have preceded industry 
restructure. It seems, however, that the whole program 
was focused on the industry privatization. Consequently, 
it appears only the economic dimension of the program 
received attention and other dimensions were ignored. 
Since electricity reforms have widespread ramifications 
which extend into economic, social, environmental, and 
political spheres of society, the government should put 
more focus on these ramifications. Reform design, the 
authors argue, should be based on broader objectives 
including sector-finance viability, adequate investment in 
new generation, reliability of supply, equitable access of 
supply, promotion of social equity, environmental 
protection and effective regulation. Also, regulatory 
reform is a prerequisite for the effective implementation 
of the reform program and for the ongoing governance of 
the industry. A regulatory process with high degree of 
transparency, accountability, and provision for public 
participation would contribute to good governance of the 
electricity sector. This would help achieve balance 
between various interest groups, for instance, public, 
consumers and investors. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper describes the historical evolution of the Thai 
electricity industry with emphasis on the internal and 
external forces that have shaped such evolution. It then 
examines the veracity of purported rationale for 
electricity reform in Thailand. A review of the Thai 
electricity reform reveals that the purported rationale for 
a market-oriented reform is unsupportable on the basis of 
the technological, economic, environmental, social and 
political realities prevalent in Thailand. This is because 
the socio-economic realities in Thailand are not 
conducive to the undertaking of market reform as 
proposed. These realities include macroeconomic 
conditions, its power system, its political situation, the 
size of country and the capacity of its domestic financial 
market and institutions. This paper also recommends that 
regulatory reform should be undertaken prior to 
structural reform. 
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